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THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF RECUSAL OF SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICES: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR SWISHER 
STEVEN M. KLEPPER∗ 
In his recent Maryland Law Review article,1 Professor Keith Swish-
er examines the problems of contemporary judicial recusal theory 
and offers valuable insight on how to solve those problems.  His doc-
trinal analysis covers all American judges, state and federal.  Here, I 
will examine the practical aspects of a discrete sub issue, the recusal of 
United States Supreme Court Justices.  A Justice’s constitutional duty 
to decide cases is a barrier to recusal in cases where the Justice sees no 
conflict, but where the public might reasonably perceive a disqualify-
ing conflict.  Because a four-to-four deadlock results in affirmance of 
the judgment below, the act of recusal is effectively a vote to affirm.  
Building on recent articles advocating for designation of retired Jus-
tices to sit in place of recused Justices,2 I will suggest how to improve 
such proposals and examine some collateral benefits of such designa-
tion. 
I.  IMPLICATIONS OF RECUSAL ON THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (“ACA”) 
MANDATE 
During Justice Kagan’s first year on the bench, when she recused 
herself from one-third of the Court’s cases, the Court affirmed only 
two cases based on an equally divided vote.3  Given that four-to-four 
splits occur, on average, less than once per term, even supporters of 
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cuses on appellate matters.  He is a graduate of the J.D./M.A. program in legal history at 
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 1.  Keith Swisher, Recusal, Government Ethics, and Superannuated Constitutional Theory, 
72 MD. L. REV. 219 (2012). 
 2.  Lisa T. McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, Coming Off the Bench: Legal and Policy Implica-
tions of Proposals to Allow Retired Justices to Sit by Designation on the Supreme Court, 61 DUKE L.J. 
81 (2011); Rebekah Saidman-Krauss, Comment, A Second Sitting: Assessing the Constitutional-
ity and Desirability of Allowing Retired Supreme Court Justices to Fill Recusal-Based Vacancies on the 
Bench, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 253 (2011). 
 3.  McElroy & Dorf, supra note 2, at 94. 
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legislation to replace recused Justices questioned in 2011 whether 
such deadlocks presented a “substantial problem.”4  But now, when 
one considers the story of the ACA decision in retrospect, the prob-
lem comes into focus. 
Justices Thomas and Kagan rejected calls for their recusal from 
the ACA cases.5  I accept the judgment of both Justices in rejecting 
those calls.6  But, in an ideal world, both would have recused them-
selves to avoid even the appearance of a conflict.  Dual recusal proba-
bly would not have affected the result, but it would have further dis-
tanced the ACA decision from any “politicians in robes” narrative.7 
Under our current regime, however, Justices Thomas and Kagan, 
once they determined they could decide the case impartially, had the 
constitutional obligation to sit.  The judicial power is “vested in one 
[S]upreme Court.”8  Because neither Justice could control whether 
the other would recuse, recusal by either Justice threatened to dead-
lock the Court and abnegate the Court’s constitutional obligation to 
exercise its judicial power.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit had struck down the individual mandate,9 the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had affirmed the individual mandate,10 
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had ruled that 
the Anti-Injunction Act required a multi-year delay in adjudicating the 
question.11  A four-to-four split was not a viable constitutional option. 
As it turns out, a recusal by Justice Thomas likely would not have 
changed the decision, except to eliminate his single-paragraph sepa-
                                                        
 4.  See id. at 94–96 (considering whether the Leahy bill, which proposed the substitu-
tion of retired Justices for recused Justices, would be effective in addressing concerns 
about four-to-four splits). 
 5.  John Gibeaut, Sitting This One Out: Health Care Case Again Raises Recusal Controversy, 
98 A.B.A. J., Mar. 2012, at 18. 
 6.  Both Justice Thomas and Justice Kagan participated in the Court’s decision in the 
ACA cases.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  
 7.  See A. Christopher Bryant, Constitutional Forbearance, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 695, 702 
(2012) (discussing how a judge’s actions may demonstrate her commitments); James L. 
Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme 
Court?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 195, 211 (2011) (arguing that knowledgeable people may be 
less likely to perceive judges as “politicians in robes”). 
 8.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 9.  Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 
1328 (11th Cir. 2011), affirmed in part, reversed in part by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 
2566. 
 10.  Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2011), abrogated by Nat’l Fed’n of In-
dep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 534 (6th 
Cir. 2011), abrogated by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566. 
 11.  Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 397–98 (4th Cir. 2011).  
  
2013] SUPREME COURT RECUSALS 15 
rate dissent.12  But a recusal by Justice Kagan would have presented a 
different story.  We now know that the Court originally voted five-to-
four in conference to strike down the mandate, but that Chief Justice 
Roberts later decided to affirm the mandate as an exercise of the tax-
ing power.13 
Had Justice Kagan recused herself, the vote in conference would 
have been five-to-three to strike down the mandate.  Because a change 
in vote by the Chief Justice would have deadlocked the Court, leaving 
the circuits split, it seems unlikely that he would have changed his 
vote at all.  Most likely the ACA would have fallen.  The ACA decision 
demonstrates that a Justice’s Article III obligation is too weighty for a 
Justice to recuse unless an actual, not merely perceived, disqualifying 
interest exists. 
II.  PROPOSALS TO ALLOW RETIRED JUSTICES TO SIT 
But what if Justice Kagan knew that retired Justice John Paul Ste-
vens could have taken her place?  She could have cured the perceived 
conflict without fear of violating her Article III duties or of changing 
the result. 
At the time of his retirement, Justice Stevens expressed his regret 
that he could not thereafter sit by designation on the Supreme Court.  
In response, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced a bill that would per-
mit such designation.14  Such a proposal likely would be constitution-
al, given the wide range of control that Congress has over the compo-
sition of the Court and over the conduct of the Court’s business.15 
But the ACA decision reveals practical flaws in that proposal.  
Senator Leahy’s proposal was to permit designation where a “majority 
of active justices vote to designate and assign that retired Chief Justice 
or Associate Justice.”16  It is unclear whether, under that proposal, Jus-
tice Kagan would have been authorized to vote on that designation.17  
Such a circumstance would have raised the specter of a vote by 
                                                        
 12.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 13.  Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBS NEWS (July 1, 
2012, 1:29 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464549/roberts-switched-
views-to-uphold-health-care-law/. 
 14.  Saidman-Krauss, supra note 2, at 253. 
 15.  See McElroy & Dorf, supra note 2, at 107–12 (discussing the constitutionality of the 
Leahy bill); Saidman-Krauss, supra note 2, at 268–78 (same). 
 16.  McElroy & Dorf, supra note 2, at 83 n.4. 
 17.  See id. at 103 n.91 (noting that the Leahy bill lacked clarity as to whether the 
recused Justice would have a vote in designating a retired Justice). 
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proxy.18  But if Justice Kagan was recused from the vote on the de-
signee, the Court may well have deadlocked on choosing the re-
placement Justice, meaning that no Justice would have taken her 
place.19 
Other potential designation schemes are problematic.  If the 
Chief Justice were to choose the designee, he could wield dispropor-
tionate influence.20  Two law professors, in proposing a random lot-
tery system, have conceded disincentives where the Justice sees too 
high a risk of designation of an ideological foe.21  The commentary on 
the Leahy proposal demonstrates that any case-by-case selection of re-
tired Justices is likely too problematic to succeed as a practical matter. 
III.  THE BENEFITS OF A TERM-BY-TERM APPROACH 
A term-by-term approach would significantly reduce these practi-
cal problems.  By the Court’s September conference, each Justice 
could draft a prioritized list identifying any retired Justices who can 
take his or her place in the event of recusal.  For instance, Justice Ka-
gan might designate Justice Stevens first, with Justice Souter her sec-
ond choice if Justice Stevens is recused or unavailable, and with Jus-
tice O’Connor her third choice.  The iconoclastic Justice Thomas, by 
contrast, might list none of his retired colleagues, meaning that (as 
now) only eight Justices would sit in the event of his recusal.  If a Jus-
tice’s list changed from one year to the next, the changes would apply 
only to cases first docketed thereafter. 
This proposal should minimize the risk that a Justice, by recusing 
himself or herself from a case, would influence the result.  Rather, 
each Justice would, on a global basis not tethered to any individual 
case, be identifying which (if any) retired Justices sufficiently share his 
or her judicial philosophy to serve as a replacement.  We thereby 
would minimize the degree to which recusals influence the outcome 
of a case, one way or the other. 
Given the logistical problems inherent in swapping Justices in 
and out during certiorari conferences,22 retired Justices should not 
                                                        
 18.  See Saidman-Krauss, supra note 2, at 281 (arguing that if a recused Justice could 
vote on her replacement, she “would likely hand-pick the retiree most likely to vote in 
alignment with how [she] would have voted [on the outcome of the case],” and therefore 
“be essentially voting by proxy”). 
 19.  McElroy & Dorf, supra note 2, at 103. 
 20.  Saidman-Krauss, supra note 2, at 281–82. 
 21.  McElroy & Dorf, supra note 2, at 101, 103. 
 22.  See, e.g., id. at 99 & n.77, 101–02 & n.83 (arguing that a Justice would have to recu-
se herself “before she knows whether four of her colleagues will vote to grant certiorari,” 
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participate in certiorari votes.  But because a Justice’s recusal from a 
certiorari vote is effectively a vote to deny certiorari under the present 
regime,23 the number of votes required to grant certiorari should be 
reduced from four to three in any case where a Justice is recused.  
Given that Congress sets the quorum rules for the Court and legislates 
the scope of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction,24 such a proposal 
should not violate the separation of powers, even though the Court 
has traditionally set the rules for minimum certiorari thresholds.25 
This proposal is not perfect.  If certiorari seems inevitable for a 
major case at the time of the Court’s September conference, a Justice 
could rewrite his or her list to influence the result.  But it is better 
than the present system, where the very act of recusal is effectively a 
vote to affirm the judgment below. Term-by-term designation presents 
the best means of diluting the influence of recusal upon the result in 
a given case. 
IV.  COLLATERAL BENEFITS OF DESIGNATING RETIRED JUSTICES 
The primary goal of designation should be to encourage Justices 
to recuse themselves in cases where the public reasonably could per-
ceive a conflict.  But there are at least four collateral benefits. 
First, such a rule could encourage Justices to retire when they no 
longer feel at the top of their game but are not ready to say goodbye 
to the Court entirely.  Right now, many Democrats are exasperated 
that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has yet to announce her retirement 
while Democrats hold both the presidency and the Senate.26  And it 
was not so long ago that Republicans harbored similar frustration 
over Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s inability—notwithstanding fail-
ing health and his professed desire to allow a Republican president to 
replace him—to bring himself to retire under a Republican president 
                                                        
and that, under the Leahy proposal, four Justices voting to grant certiorari “could push for 
a particular retired Justice to sit in, and . . . would effectively win the case before it is even 
argued”); see also Steven Lubet, Disqualifications of Supreme Court Justices: The Certiorari Co-
nundrum, 80 MINN. L. REV. 657, 658 (1995) (noting that when a Justice is recused prior to 
the certiorari conference, “the right of the petitioner to apparent impartiality may be se-
cured, but only at the cost of actual disadvantage when it comes to obtaining Supreme 
Court review”).  
 23.  See Lubet, supra note 22, at 662 (“In certiorari, only ‘Yes’ votes count. Without four 
positive votes, a petition will not be granted.  An abstention, therefore, is indistinguishable 
from a ‘No.’” (footnote omitted)). 
 24.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 1253–1260 (2006). 
 25.  Lubet, supra 22, at 662 n.26. 
 26.  Jonathan Bernstein, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Must Go, SALON (Mar. 30, 2013, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.salon.com/2013/03/30/ruth_bader_ginsburg_must_go/. 
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and Republican Senate.27  If a Republican is elected in 2016, many 
Republicans would want Justices Scalia and Kennedy to hand their re-
tirement announcements to the new President at the inauguration.  
The ability to continue to sit by designation could provide a valuable 
carrot to a Justice considering retirement. There is also a stick.  All 
three retired Justices are to the left of the Court’s present center, giv-
ing members of the present majority an incentive to retire under the 
next Republican president to move the pool of retired Justices right-
ward. 
Second, a designation scheme cures a significant hole in Article 
III—the absence of a provision for incapacitated Justices. President 
Kennedy’s 1963 assassination prompted ratification of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment, under which the Vice President serves as Acting 
President while the President is “unable to discharge the powers and 
duties of his office.”28  But there remains no such provision for a Jus-
tice unable to discharge the powers of office.  If a Justice were in a 
persistent vegetative state, Congress perhaps might take the drastic 
step of impeaching and removing the Justice on the theory that “no 
behavior” means the Justice is no longer exhibiting “good behavior.”29  
But if any possibility existed that a Justice might return to health, re-
moval of a Justice with lifetime tenure could present serious constitu-
tional questions.  Indeed, if a Justice needs time away to address a ma-
jor health problem or to deal with a major life event (such as the 
death of a spouse) that could interfere with his or her judgment, the 
Justice should be able to take a temporary leave of absence without 
fear of interrupting the Court’s business. 
Third, designation could eliminate a disincentive for Presidents 
to nominate solicitors general to the Supreme Court.  Only five Jus-
tices, including Justice Kagan, have joined the bench with experience 
as Solicitor General, an office created in 1870.30  Thus, notwithstand-
ing the exceptional experience and qualifications of the typical Solici-
tor General, it is surprisingly rare that the so-called “Tenth Justice” 
                                                        
 27.  JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 
277–78 (2008). 
 28.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXV; see also John D. Feerick, The Proposed Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 173, 178 (1965) (“The tragic death of 
President Kennedy on November 22, 1963, revived the question of presidential inability.”). 
 29.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 30.  SUSAN NAVARRO SMELCER & KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R41299, FROM SOLICITOR GENERAL TO SUPREME COURT NOMINEE: RESPONSIBILITIES, 
HISTORY, AND THE NOMINATION OF ELENA KAGAN 8–14 (2010).  Failed 1987 nominee Rob-
ert Bork served as Solicitor General in the 1970s.  Al Kamen & Matt Schudel, Iconic Con-
servative Judge and Lightning Rod, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2012, at A1. 
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becomes the ninth Justice.31  To nominate an incumbent Solicitor 
General to the Supreme Court, a President must prefer the Solicitor 
General so strongly over all other potential nominees that the Presi-
dent is willing to see that future Justice recuse himself or herself from 
a large number of cases during the first year on the job.32  If, however, 
a new Justice could submit a list of replacement Justices, a President 
may be much more willing to nominate his or her Solicitor General. 
Finally, if recusal of a Justice will not jeopardize the Court’s Arti-
cle III obligation to decide cases, Supreme Court nominees will have 
one fewer excuse to avoid giving meaningful answers during confir-
mation hearings.  In 1995, then-Professor Elena Kagan lamented the 
post-Bork decline of substantive questioning of nominees: “When the 
Senate ceases to engage nominees in meaningful discussion of legal 
issues, the confirmation process takes on an air of vacuity and farce, 
and the Senate becomes incapable of either properly evaluating nom-
inees or appropriately educating the public.”33  In 2010, then-
nominee Elena Kagan proved her mastery of the non-answer, refusing 
to comment on cases that might come before the Court.34  Designa-
tion of retired Justices will not alone usher in an era of substantive 
hearings, but it should at least theoretically aid in opening the con-
firmation dialogue. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Recusal of Supreme Court Justices calls not just for doctrinal re-
form, but also for a workable scheme for Justices to recuse themselves 
without jeopardizing the Court’s Article III obligation to decide cases.  
If we want Justices to recuse themselves in cases where they see no ac-
tual conflict, but where the public reasonably could perceive a con-
flict, we need to provide a mechanism for ensuring that designation is 
unlikely to change the result.  A term-by-term model for each Justice 
                                                        
 31.  SMELCER & THOMAS, supra note 30, at 2, 4–7. 
 32.  It is not as clear why so few former Solicitors General become Justices.  Quite pos-
sibly, even the slightest taste of lucrative private practice as a former Solicitor General dis-
inclines him or her from the judiciary.  Justice Scalia recently remarked that he never 
would have been a Justice if President Reagan had nominated him, rather than Rex Lee, 
to become Solicitor General in 1981.  Gaëtan Gerville-Réache, Justice Scalia at the AJEI 
Summit in New Orleans, APP. ISSUES, Feb. 2013, at 2, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/appellate_issues/2013win_
ai.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 33.  Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 920 (1995) 
(book review).  
 34.  See Keith J. Bybee, Will the Real Elena Kagan Please Stand up? Conflicting Public Images 
in the Supreme Court Confirmation Process, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 137, 152 (2011) (de-
scribing the evasiveness of Kagan’s answers during her confirmation hearings). 
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to select his or her replacement accomplishes this goal while largely 
avoiding the unseemliness of a Justice directly picking his or her re-
placement on a case-by-case basis. 
